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ILLEGITIMATES AND EQUAL PROTECTION

Illegitimates often have been discriminated against by legislatures in the enactment of statutes, as well as by courts which have
sanctioned such legislation. This article will examine the judicial
response to legislative treatment of the illegitimate in social insurance, loss compensation, and intestacy statutes. Emphasizing the
Supreme Court's analysis of the legal status of illegitimates in
terms of the equal protection clause, it will also discuss how the
principle of equal protection may be applied in order to reduce the
number of illegitimates denied the benefit and protection of the
law.
I.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF ILLEGITIMATES

A. Social Insurance Legislation
Several federal statutes, including the Social Security Act, 1 contain provisions which discriminate against illegitimates seeking the
benefits available under these social insurance programs. Although
such provisions rarely make benefits explicitly 1,1naltainable, benefits may nevertheless be denied by imposing a greater burden of
proof on illegitimate claimants than upon legitimate claimants. 2
For example, under the Social Security Act, children's benefits
may be payable when a parent qualifies for a retirement or disability pension, or when the insured parent dies. 3 To be considered
eligible for Social Security benefits based upon the contributions of
an insured parent, the illegitimate must first be deemed a "child"
within the Act's provisions. 4 The Act, however, declares the illegitimate to be prima facie ineligible5 and grants "child" status
only if, in addition to establishing paternity, 6 the illegitimate can

'42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
See, e.g., the text accompanying notes 9-10 infra. See also Semmel, Social Security
Benefits for Illegitimate Children after Levy v. Lousiana, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 289 (1970).
3 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(I) (Supp. V 1975).
• 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(I) (Supp. V 1975); 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (Supp. V 1975).
5
42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(l) (Supp. V 1975); 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (Supp. V 1975).
6 See e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(A)(ii) (1970) ("[S]';lch insured in?ividual is shown bv
evidence satisfactory to the secretary to be the father of the applicant. ... ").
2
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meet one of several other qualifying conditions. The illegitimate
may be deemed a "child" if the applicable state intestacy statute
makes the person an heir 7 or if the parents' marriage ceremony was
invalidated on technical grounds. 8 Additionally, the illegitimate
may qualify if he obtains a written acknowledgement of paternity, a
judicial decree of paternity, or a judicial support order. 9 The illegitimate may also be deemed a "child" if the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare is satisfied with respect to paternity and
proof of dependency exists at the time of the event insured
against. 10
As a result, illegitimate claimants are required to present proof of
paternity as well as proof of some other factor indicative of a
"family" relationship. The latter burden weighs most heavily on
those illegitimates who must prove actual dependency at the time
of the event insured against. In contrast, proof of dependency is
not required of legitimate children since there is a statutory presumption in their favor. 11 In effect, the statute favors legitimate
children regardless of their· actual dependency. While proof of
dependency is not required of illegitimates qualifying under the
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1970).
42 U .S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B) (1970).
• 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(A)(i), (B)(i), (C)(i) (1970). Section 416(h)(3) read.sin relevant part:
(3) An applicant who is the son or daughter of a fully or currently insured individual, but who is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured individual
under paragraph (2) of this subsection [i.e., the intestacy and invalid marriage
qualifications], shall nevertheless be deemed to be the child of such insured
individual if:
(A) in the case of an insured individual entitled to old-age insurance benefits
7

8

(i) such insured individual({) has acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son or daughter,
(II) has been decreed by a court to be the father of the applicant, or
(III) has been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the
applicant because the applicant is his son or daughter,
and such acknowledgement, court decree, or court order was made not less than
one year before such insured individual became entitled to old-age insurance
benefits or attained age 65, whichever is earlier ....
10 42 U .S.C. § 416(h)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii). (C)(ii). Section 416(h)(3)(A)(ii) reads in part:
(ii) such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the Secretary to be
the father of the applicant and was living with or contributing to the support of the
applicant at the time such insured individual became entitled to benefits ....
Section 416(h)(3)(B) repeats this language but with respect to individuals entitled to disability insurance benefits; § 416(h)(3)(C) does the same for those entitled to death benefits.
11
42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1970) reads in part as follows:
(3) A child shall be deemed dependent ... unless ... such individual [i.e., an
(adopting) father or (adopting) mother] was not living with or contributing to the
support of such child and-(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individual, or
(B) such child has been adopted by some other individual.
For purposes of this paragraph, a child deemed to be a child of a fully or currently
insured individual pursuant to section 416(h)(2)(B) or section 416(h)(3) of this title
shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of such individual.
Despite the omission of a reference to section 416(h)(2)(A) in this section, the Court has
determined that children qualifying via that provision are deemed dependent as well.
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
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intestacy, invalid marriage, or proof by document provisions of the
Act, the illegitimate child unable to offer evidence of a parental
relationship is required to prove dependency in fact to receive
benefits under the Social Security Act.
In two recent decisions concerning illegitimacy, the Supreme
Court has reached different conclusions with respect to the presumption of dependency. In Jimenez v. Weinberger, 12 the claimants were the illegitimate, dependent children of a disabled worker.
The dependency presumption was unavailable to them by virtue of
their illegitimacy and the inapplicability of the statute's special
qualifying provisions. 13 Moreover, because tl;i..@Y were born after
the onset of the disability, the children were unable to prove their
dependency "at the time" that their father's disability was sustained, as the Act required. The Court, however, used an equal
protection analysis to reverse the denial of their benefits by probing the rationality of the relation between the legislative means
and ends and the extent to which the statutory result reflected the
statutory purpose. The Court determined that the exclusion of
these illegitimates was not "reasonably related to the prevention of
spurious claims," and that "it would not serve the purposes of the
Act to conclusively deny them an opportunity to establish their
dependency." 14
Mathews v. Lucas 15 involved illegitimate children whose father
died following an absence of several years from the home. As a
result, they were unable to prove dependency "at the time" of his
death. Despite the demonstrable fact that the iµsured had lived
with the family for the eighteen years prior to his departure, the
Court upheld the denial of benefits finding no violation of equal
protection. 16 The statutory classification which excluded these
children was justified, in part, on the grounds of administrative
convenience. The Court also found the classification permissible
because it was "reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency
at death." 17
The Act's unfavorable treatment of illegitimates has not been
confined to the provisions challenged in Jimene·z and Lucas. Until
recently, illegitimates of a particular class were the first members
of a "family" to have their benefits reduced if the total benefits
received by the household exceeded the statutory maximum. 18
12

417 U.S. 628 (1974).
See notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
• 417 U.S. at 636.
15
427 U .s. 495 (1976).
16
/d. at 516.
11
Id. at 509.
18 42 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 403(a) (Supp. V 1975)),
originally excluded those illegitimates qualifyil)g via § 4l6(h)(3).
13

1
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This policy was justified on the ground that such a scheme reasonably reflected the greater probability that certain groups of
children were more likely to be dependent than others, 19 even
though these children were statutorily entitled to the same presumption of dependency as legitimates, or had, in fact, earned that
status by proving their dependency. Later challenges, however,
successfully attacked the provision as impermissibly discriminatory insofar as it lacked any rational justification. 20
In addition to the Social Security Act, numerous other federal
statutes provide similar payments of benefits for federal employees
and their dependents. 21 The illegitimate's receipt of benefits is
often conditioned on qualifying as ·a "child" as defined in each
statute, 22 with some statutes imposing a dependency requirement
as well. 23 Benefits have also been conditioned upon a finding that a
"recognized natural child" lives in a "regular parent-child relationship" with the person covered by the particular statute. 24
These limitations may be discriQJ.inatory, not only with respect to
illegitimates, but also with respect to any nontraditional family
relationship, such as single-parent families, communal households,
homosexual parenthood, and older-sibling parenthood. Strict interpretation of such restrictions would result in the denial of benefits to claimants in these situations. In the event that the limitation
will be litigated, th_e courts may construe the standard in accordance with the liberal interpretation generally given to benefit
statutes. 25
19 Watts v. Veneman, 334 F. Supp. 482 (D.D.C. 1971), affd in part, rev'd in part, 476
F.2d 529 (D.C. Cir. 1973); P-arker v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 453 F.2d 850
(5th Cir. 1972).
20 Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972) (invidious discrimination found
against§ 416(h)(3) illegitimates), and.Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Md. 1972)
(same), both aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). Accord, Maracle v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp.
234 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Williams v. Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.N.C. 1972); Morris v.
Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Ga. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 409 U.S. 464
(1973).
21
E.g., Civil Service Retirement Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8348 (1970 & Supp. V 1975);
Federal Employees Health Insurance Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8901-8913 (1970 & Supp. V 1975);
Federal Survivors Benefit Plan, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447-1455 (Supp. V 1975); Foreign Services
Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1061-1121 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
22 Civil Service Retirement Act, 5 U .S.C § 8341 (Supp. V 1975); Federal Employees
Health Insurance Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8901 (1970); Federal Survivors Benefit Plan, IO U.S.C. §
1447 (Supp. V 1975); Foreign Services Act, 22 U .S.C § 1064 (1970).
23 Federal Survivors Benefit Plan, 10 U.S.C. § 1447 (Supp. V 1975); Foreign Services Act,
22 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970); 37 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V 1975).
24 Civil Service Retirement Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a)(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 1975); Federal
Employees Health Insurance Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8901(5)(8) (1970); Federal Survivors Benefit
Plan, 10 U .S.C. § 1447(5)(C)(ii) (Supp. V 1975).
25
See, e.g., United States v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 292 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1934). See also Miller v. Laird, 349
F. Supp. 1034 (D.D.C. 1972) (Dependents Medical Care Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1088 (1970
& Supp. V 1975), violated the equal protection clause by gratuitously excluding any illegitimate from its coverage, 10 U .S.C. § 1072.).
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Entitlement to benefits, however, should rest on a firmer foundation than the personal sympathies of the judge. In this respect, the
"regular parent-child relationship" concept may be vulnerable to a
challenge based upon vagueness and possible overbreadth. While
such a flaw might be remedied using language more explicitly
describing the aspect of the insured-claimant relationship on which
Congress desires to condition the receipt of benefits, any attempt
to draw these new lines too narrowly would raise equal protection
issues. 26
B. Loss Compensation Statutes

The difficulties faced by illegitimates claiming support benefits
are also present in statutes providing compensation for the losses
suffered by the claimant upon the wrongful or work-related death
of the parent. 27 In general, illegitimates have received more favorable treatment where federal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction
to interpret a federal compensation statute, 28 than where jurisdiction is shared with state courts. 29 Federal courts have tended to
avoid reliance on analogous state law, even where the structure
and language of the federal act appear to warrant such reliance. For
example, although the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance
Act30 establishes a hierarchy of claimants to the death benefits by
using language characteristic of many state intestate succession
laws, 31 the federal courts, in accord with the Act's beheficial,
26

See, e.g., notes 75-79 & 141-49 and accompanying texts infra.
E.g., Federal Group Life Insurance Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8716 (1970& Supp. V 1975);
National Service Life Insurance Act, 38 U.S.C § 801 (1970); Servicemen's Group Life
Insurance Act, 38 U.S.C. § 770 (1970); Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51
(1970); Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U .S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970); Jones Act, 46 U .S.C. § 688
(1970).
28
See Hebert v. Petroleum Pipe Inspectors, Inc., 396 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1968) (Jones Act,
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970)); Civil v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 217 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954) (Death on
the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970)); Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., Inc.,
70 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. l934)(same); Hamilton Co., Inc. v. Canal Barge Co., Inc., 395 F. Supp.
978 (E.D. La. 1975) (same). See generally Note, Illegitimates: Definition of "Children"
under Federal Welfare Legislation, 67 CoLUM. L. REV. 984 (1967).
29
Compare Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., Inc., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir: 1934)
(holding that federal law permits the inclusion of illegitimates within the statute's scope),
with Willis v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 405 U.S. 318 (1972) (per curiam) (an equally-divided
Court upholding a Georgia state court's decision to define the term "child" in construing the
Serviceman's Group Life Insurance Act, 38 U .S.C. § 770 (1970), with reference to local law,
Prudential Life Ins. Co. v. Willis, 227 Ga. 619, 182 S.E.2d 420 (1971)). See also Dobyns v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co., 227 Ga. 253, 179 S.E.2d 915 (1971).
au 5 U.S.C. §§ 8701-8716 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
31
5 U. S.C. § 8705 (1970) reads in part:
(a) The amount of group life insurance ... shall be paid ... in the following order
of precedence:
First, to the beneficiary ....
Second, if there is no designated beneficiary, to the widow or widower of the
employee.
27
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remedial nature, have generally chosen to interpret it in terms of
support or loss compensation rather than in terms of property
distribution on intestacy. 32 This interpretation has the advantage of
avoiding the incorporation of inconsistent state legislation and its
often unfavorable application· to the claims of illegitimates. 33 In
cases involving federal statutes which operate independently of
state law, the federal courts have found a similar congressional
intent to compensate the recipient for loss of society and care 34 or,
simply, to bestow a benefit. 35 The reliance of federal courts on
federal common law in interpreting loss compensation statutes
should continue to benefit illegitimates in the future. The occasional intrusion of state law, 36 however, is a reminder of the precarious status which illegitimates now enjoy.
At the state level, illegitimates have gained increased access to
compensation benefits as a result of several recent decisions. In
Levy v. Louisiana 37 and Giana v. American Guarantee & Liability
Insurance Co., 38 the Supreme <:;:ourt sharply curtailed the ability of
states to discriminate against illegitimates in wrongful death statute
cases that involved Louisiana's wrongful death statute 39 which
denied a cause of action to illegitimates for the death of their
mother and to a mother for the death of her illegitimate son.
In Levy, five illegitimate children sued for damages for the
wrongful death of their mother. Concluding that distinctions drawn
on the basis of the claimant's birth status bore "no relation to the
nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother," the Court
held that these distinctions constituted invidious discrimination
against illegitimates in violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 40 Similarly, in Giana the Court found
"no possible rational basis" for assuming that the policy of disThird, if none of the above, to the child or children of the employee and
descendants of deceased children by representation.
Fourth, if none of the above, to the parents of the employee or the survivor of
them.
Fifth, if none of the above, to the duly appointed executor or administrator of
the estate of the employee.
Sixth, if none of the above, to other next of kin of the employee entitled under
the laws of the domicile of the employee at the date of his death.
32 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 368 F.2d 791 (3d Cir. 1966); Brantley v.
Skeens, 266 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Varker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 184 F. Supp.
159 (M.D.N.C. 1960).
33 See, e.g., the statutes cited in notes 50-54 infra.
34
Tune v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 223 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Tenn. 1963) (Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970)).
35 United States v. Philippine Nat'I Bank, 292 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (National Service
Life Insurance Act, 38 .U .S.C. § 801 (1970)).
36
See note 29 supra.
37
391 u .s. 68 (1968).
38 Id. at 73.
39
LA. C1v. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1967) (amended 1973).
40
391 U.S. at 72.
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couraging illegitimacy would be undermined by permitting a
natural mother to be compensated under the statute for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child.41
The Court followed a similar approach in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 42 where two illegitimate children of the decedent
sought to be included as "children" under the Louisiana workmen's compensation statute. 43 The statute classified illegitimate
children as "other dependents," who were entitled to recover only
if the statutorily limited award had not been exhausted by prior
takers, which included the decedent's legitimate children. The
Weber Court was unable to perceive a "significant relationship"
between the discriminatory means employed by the statute and the
statutory purpose of providing support for the dependents of the
decedent. 44 Consequently, the provision was held to violate the
equal protection clause. 45 As in Glona, the Court concluded that
the state's interest in· discouraging illicit sexual activity between
adults \:Vas not effectively furthered by the discriminatory classification of illegitimate children. 46
C. Intestate Succession Statutes
Intestate succession has long been considered a matter of state
concem. 47 Uniform treatment of illegitimates under intestacy statutes became impossible as states pursued different courses in
mitigating the harsh common law attitude towards illegitimates.
Although the doctrine of nullius filius (the child of no one) is no
longer the letter of the law in any state, its spirit is still felt. 48 With

Id. at 75.
406 u .s. 164 (1972).
43
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 23.1232 (West 1967).
44
406 U.S. at 175.
45
Id. at 176.
46
Id. See generally Gray & Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate: Levy v.
Louisiana and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., I 18 U. PA. L. REV.
I (1969); Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REv. 477 (I967);Note'
Discrimination Based upon I/legitimacy as a Denial of Equal Protection, 43 TUL. L. REV.
383 (1969); Comment, Providing for Illegitimates-Workmen's Compensation, 19 Lov. L.
REv. 242 (1973); Comment, A Decision on Illegitimacy: A Quest For Equality, 34 U. PITT.
L. REv. 472 (1973); Recent Developments, 18 VILL. L. REV. 759 (1973); Recent Developments, 44 WASH. L. REV. 523 (1969).
47
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164; 170 (1972); Seaboard Air Lines Ry. v.
Kenney, 240 U.S. 489, 490 (1916). But see Trimble v. Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 4395 (S. Ct.
Apr. 26, 1977). See generally Note, Inheritance Rights of I/legitimate Children Under the
Equal Protection Clause, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1336 (1970).
48
In its earliest forms, the common law doctrine deemed the illegitimate to have no
inheritable blood nor any rights of inheritance from either parent. W. HOOPER, THE LAW OF
ILLEGITIMACY 25-27 (191 I). Although the burden has been eased generally, specific inclusion of illegitimates in various statutes is often required to overcome the common law bias
against them.
'
41

42
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the exception of Louisiana, 49 all states permit an illegitimate child
to inherit automatically from the natural mother ,50 and some states
allow inheritance from the mother's kindred as well. 51 Most states
allow illegitimates to succeed to their father's intestate estate,
however, only on proof of paternity and his acknowledgment or
recognition of the child as his own. 52 In some states inheritance

49 According to the Louisiana scheme·, there are two kinds of illegitimate childre11: those
born to parents who are capable of marrying each other, and those born to parents whose
marriage is prevented by some legal impediment. LA. C1v. CODE ANN. art. 181 (West 1952).
Only those born to parents free to marry each other are capable of being acknowledged by
either parent, thereby earning the designation "natural child;" those illegitimates not so
fortunate are termed "bastards," either adulterous, id. art. 182, or incestuous, id. art. 183,
depending upon the nature of the impediment to their parents' marriage.
Illegitimates are not entitled to inherit until acknowledged; if not acknowledged, the law
grants them nothing more than a "mere alimony" interest. Id. art. 920. An acknowledged
natural child can inherit from the mother to the exclusion of her kindred, but not to the
exclusion of lawful children and descendants. Id. art. 918. An acknowledged natural child
can inherit from its father only to the exclusion of the state. Id. art. 919.
50
ALA. CODE tit. 16, § 7 (1959); ALASKA STAT.§ 13.11.045 (1972); Aruz. REV. STAT.§
14-2109 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141 (1971); CAL. PROB. CoDE § 255 (West 1975);
CoLO. REV. STAT.§ 15-11-109 (1973); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 45-274 (West 1960); DEL.
CoDE tit. 12, § 508 (Supp. 1976); D.C. CooE § 19-316 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 731.29
(West 1964); GA. CooE ANN. § 113-904 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 532-6 (1969); IDAHO
CoDE § 15-2-109 (Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); IND.
CooE ANN.§ 29-1-2-7 (Bums 1972); IOWA CoDE § 633.221 (1975); KAN. STAT.§ 59-501
(1964); KY. REv. STAT.§ 391.090(1972); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 1003 (1965); Mo. EST. &
TRUSTS CoDE ANN. § 1-208 (1974); MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch. 190, § 5 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 702.81 (1970); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 525.172 (West 1975);
Miss. CoDE ANN.§ 91-1-15 (1972); Mo. REv. STAT.§ 474.060 (1969); MoNT. REv. CooEs
ANN. § 91A-2-109 (1975); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2309 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 134.170
(1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 561.4 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 3A:4-7 (West 1953); N.M.
STAT. ANN.§ 32A-2-109 (1975); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW§ 4-1.2 (McKinney
1967); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 29-18 (1976); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 30.1-04-09 (1976); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN.§ 2105.17 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215 (West 1970); ORE. REV.
STAT.§ 112. 105 (1975); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 2107 (Purdon 1975); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 31, § 441 (Supp. 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 33-1-8 (1969); S.C. CODE§ 19-53 (1962); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN.§ 29-1-15 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 31-114 (Supp. 1976); TEX.
PROB. CODE ANN. ch. 2, § 42 (Vernon 1956); UTAH CooE ANN. § 74-4-10 (1953), but UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 75-2-109 (1975) (effective July I, 1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553 (1974);
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 84 (1964); VA. CODE§ 64.1-5 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§
11.04.081 (1967); w. VA. CODE § 42-1-5 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 852.05 (West 1971);
WYO. STAT. § 2-44 (1957).
51
ALA. CODE tit. 16, § 7 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 61-141 (1971); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 45-274 (West 1960); D.C. CooE § 19-316 (1973); HAW. REv. STAT. § 532-6 (1969);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7 (Bums
1972); low A CooE § 633.221 (1975); KY. REV. STAT. § 391.090 (1972); ME. REv. STAT. tit.
18 § 1003 (1965); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 190, § 5 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1969); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN.§ 702.81 (1970); Miss. CooE ANN.§ 91-i-15 (1972); Mo. REv. STAT.§ 474.060
(1969); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 134.170 (1973); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 561.4 (1973); N.J. STAT.
ANN.§ 3A:4-7 (West 1953); N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW§ 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967);
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 29.18 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2105.17 (Page 1976); ORE. REv.
STAT.§ 112.105 (1975); S.C. CODE§ 19-53 (1962); 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.§ 2107 (Purdon
1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 29-1-15 (1967); TEx. PRoB. CooE ANN. ch. 2, § 42
(Vernon 1956); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553 (1974); VA. CODE§ 64.1-5 (1973); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 11.04.081 (1967); w. VA. CODE § 42-1-5 (1966).
52
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.29 (West 1964); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-7 (Bums 1972); low A
CQDE § 633.222 (1975); KAN. STAT.§ 59-501 (1964); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18, § 1003 (1965);
Mo. E_ST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.§ 1-208 (1974); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 702.83 (Supp.
1976)_; MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 525.172 (West 1975); NEV. REV. STAT.§ 134.170 (1973); N.Y.
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from paternal kindred is also permitted. 53 The Uniform Probate
Code, adopted in ten jurisdictions, 54 has done much to equalize the
status of all children by focusing on the biological relationship
between parent and child as the primary qualification for intestate
succession. 55
Although the Supreme Court has not required uniformity of state
intestate succession schemes, the equal protection doctrine has
been used to establish minimum standards of fairness for illegitimates. In Labine v. Vincent, 56 the Court indicated that the states
were entitled to exercise their individual judgments with respect to
intestate succession. Labine involved an equal protection challenge to a Louisiana statute which permitted the acknowledged,
illegitimate children of a deceased father to share in the estate only
to the exclusion of the state. 57 The Court, with only a minor
reference to the equal protection issue, 58 deferred to Louisiana's
prerogatives in the area, upholding the state's interest in controlling the intestate distribution of property within its borders. 59
EsT., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW§ 4.-1.2 (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 29-18 (1976);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 2105.17 (Page 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215 (West 1970);
ORE. REv. STAT.§ 112.105 (1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN.§ 29-1-15 (1967); UTAH
CODE ANN.§ 74-4-10 (1953), but UTAH CODE ANN.§ 75-2-109 (1975) (effective July I, 1977);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553 (1974); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN.§ 11.04.081 (1%7); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 852.05 (West 1971).
53 IND. CoDE ANN.§ 29-1-2-7 (Bums 1972); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 18, § 1003 (1%5); N.C.
GEN. STAT.§ 29-18; (1976); ORE. REv. STAT.§ I 12.105 (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 553
(1974); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 852.05 (West 1971).
54 ALASKA STAT.§ 13.11.045 (1972); ARIZ. REv. STAT.§ 14-2109 (1975); CoLo. REv.
STAT.§ 15-11-109 (1973); DEL. CODE tit. 12, § 508 (Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.§
91A-2-109 (1975); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 30-2309 (1975); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 32A-2-109 (1976);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-109 (1975) (effective July I, 1977). See Gordon & Wellman,
Uniformity in State Inheritance Laws: How UPC Article II Has Fared in Nine Enactments,
1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 357 (1976).
55
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has published two
versions of§ 2-109, the provision defining "child .. for the Uniform Probate Code. The
earlier version is the 011e adopted by state legislatures to date, and reads in relevant part:
(2) ... a person born out of wedlock is a child of the mother. That person is also a
child of the father, if:
(i) the natural parents participated in a marriage ceremony before or after the
birth of the child, even though the attempted marriage is void; or
(ii) the paternity is established by an adjudication before the death of the father
or is established thereafter by clear and convincing proof, but th~ paternity
established under this subparagraph is ineffective to qualify the father or his
kindred to inherit from or through the child unless the father has openly treated
the child as his. and has not refused to support the child.
UNIFORM PROBATE CoDE § 2-109 (as approved in 1969). The section was later
revised in order to reconcile its policy with that of the Uniform Parentage Act: "(2)
... a person is the child of its parents regardless of the marital status of its parents
and the parent and child relationship may be established under the [Uniform
Parentage Act]." UNIFORM PROBATE CoDE § 2-109 (as approved in 1973). For an
example of the Uniform Parentage Act as enacted, see CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 70007019 (West Supp. 1976).
56
401 U.S. 532 (1971).
57
LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 919 (West 1952).
56 401 U.S. at 536 n.6. Four dissenting members found a violation of equal protection, id.
at 541. using the rational basis test. Id. at 548.
59
Id. _at 536-37.
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Despite this traditional judicial deference, the prerogatives of
state governments have recently been restricted by the requirements of the equal protection doctrine. In the recent case of Trimble v. Gordon, 60 the Court, after acknowledging a state's "primary
responsibility" in establishing an intestate succession scheme, 61
reaffirmed the applicability of the equal protection clause as a
means of "vindicating constitutional rights" 62 and held that the
Illinois intestacy statute, which permitted illegitimates to inherit
only from their mothers, was unconstitutional. 63 Speaking for the
majority, Justice Powell indicated that Labine was distinguishable
since the Louisiana statute reflected different legislative purposes
than the Illinois statute considered in Trimble. The opinion in
Trimble clearly stated, however, that its "more recent analysis"
will control future treatment of the issue. 64
The Court's treatment of the equal protection question in Labine
could perhaps have been attributed to the tradition of federal
deference to the states in matters of intestacy, and to the strength
of the states' interest in property distribution. 65 The demonstrated
vulnerability of Louisiana's legislative treatment of illegitimates 66
should have prompted a more extensive equal protection analysis.
In particular, the state interest in protecting the orderly distribution
of intestate property from the disruptive intrusion of "lost" or
"hidden" heirs is arguably neither furthered by, nor rationally
related to, a legislative classification which places acknowledged,
illegitimate children of the deceased after all other related takers of
the estate. The Labine Court bypassed this approach in light of the
traditional deference to state intestacy policy. The Court's most
recent discussion of this issue, 67 however, established Labine as an
anomaly and indicated that the Court was returning to a more
"traditional equal protection analysis" based on the relationship
between statutory discrimination and the promotion of state objectives. 68
II.

EQUAL PROTECTION

Modem analysis of the equal protection clause 69 requires that
discrimination be examined on a level of judicial scrutiny deter45 U.S.L.W. 4395 (S. Ct. Apr. 26, 1977).
Id. at 4397.
62 Id.
63
Id. at 4399.
64
Id. at 4399 n.17.
65
401 U.S. at 548 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Petrillo, Labine v. Vincent: Illegitimates, Inheritance and the Fourteenth Amendment, 75 DICK. L. REv. 377 (1971).
66 See notes 37-46 and accompanying text supra.
67 Trimble v. Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 4395 (S. Ct. Apr. 26, 1977).
6 & Id. at 4398.
69
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § I. The actions of the federal government are similarly
constrained by the equal protection concept of the fifth amendment. See, e.g .. Shapiro v.
60

61
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mined by the subject matter of the legislation, the nature of the
groups being affected, and the importance of the competing interests. Legislative classifications will be invalidated if they fail to
meet the tests appropriate to the level of scrutiny employed. 70
Some equal protection challenges have concerned legislative
classifications which discriminate against illegitimate children and
in favor of legitimate children, such as state intestacy statutes. In
other cases, however, the challenged classification has distinguished between groups of illegitimates. The Louisiana illegitimacy
scheme 71 and the Social Security Act's dependency presumpHons72 were both challenged on such grounds. In evaluating these
classifications in terms of the equal protection clause, it should be
noted that, while a particular provision may not have discriminated
against all illegitimates, the persons discriminated against were in
all cases illegitimate. As a result, the overriding question has been
the permissibility of using birth status as a basis for legislative
classification.
A. Strict Scrutiny

During the 196O's the Supreme Court developed a two-tier
method of equal protection analysis, 73 supplementing the traditional minimal level of scrutiny with a new stricter examination.
The more exacting level of scrutiny is employed when the legislation involves either a "suspect classification" or a "fundamental
interest." 74
Classifications based on illegitimacy should be subject to strict
judicial scrutiny insofar as they discriminate against individuals on·

Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641,42 (19(i9); Schneiderv. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
70
See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420(1961); Royster Guana Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412 (1920).
71
See note 49 supra.
72 See notes 12-20 and accompanying text supra.
73
Gunther, The Supreme Court, /971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Mode/fora Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I, 8 (1972).
74 /d. at 8-10. Classifications based on race, see, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964), national origin, see, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 ( 1948), and alienage,
see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), have all been deemed worthy of strict
scrutiny. Similarly, legislation has been found to deny equal protection where it impinged on
"fundamental interests" of the individual: voting, see, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), travel, see e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969),
procreation, see, e.g., Skinner v.Oklahoma,316 U.S. 535 (1942), and criminal appeals, see,
e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Although, theoretically, a state can constitutionally classify on these grounds if the interest it seeks to further is deemed "compelling,"
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S 618, 638 (1969), in practice, few interests have satisfied the
compelling state interest test. But see Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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the basis of their birth status. 75 Like the suspect classifications of
race, alienage, and national origin, illegitimacy is not only a characteristic of birth beyond the individual's control, 76 but it also is one
which has traditionally attracted extensive social opprobrium. 77 In
terms of the "traditional indicia of suspectness," illegitimates have
clearly been subjected to a ''history of purposeful unequal treatment, and have been saddled with ... disabilities, " 78 not because
of any inadequacy or defect inherent in the class or its members,
but as a result of a cultural bias against perceived immorality which
inaccurately, and unfairly, stigmatizes the blameless. 79
Until recently, the Supreme Court has been favorably disposed
towards the use of the strict level of scrutiny in its treatment of the
equal protection problems posed by illegitimates. 80 In Levy v.
Louisiana, 81 the Court emphasized its sensitivity to "basic civil
rights," and its willingness to strike down instances of historical
and traditional invidious discrimination. 82 With reference to the
Louisiana wrongful death statute, the Court stated that "it is invidious to discriminate against [illegitimates] when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that
was done the mother. " 83 Writing for the Court, Justic Douglas was
possibly referring to fundamental rights when. describing "[t]he

75
See Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 46. at 15-17; Krause, supra note 46, at 488. See also
Alito, Equal Protection and Classifications Based on Family Membership, 80 DICK. L. REV.
4IO (1976), and Comment, The Expanding Rights of the Illegitimate, 3 CREIGHTON L. REV.
135 (1970), for discussions of possibly fundamental interests of the illegitimate.
76
See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065,
1126-27 ( 1969). A similar argument on behalf of sex as a suspect classification has met with
the approval of a plurality of the Court. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
See also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Frontiero, the plurality opinion identified sex
as an immutable birth characteristic bearing little relation to the individual's ability to
contribute to society, 411 U.S. at 686-87, and supported the proposition that the burden
imposed should bear some relationship to individual responsibility. Id. at 686, citing Weber
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). The opinion went on to dismiss
administrative convenience as a sufficient justification for a scheme which required a male
spouse to prove dependency on his military wife but presumed a wife's dependency on her
military husband. 411 U.S. at 688-89.
77
Gray & Rudovsky, supra note 46, at 6.
78
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973).
79
See Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society-A Proposed Uniform Act on
Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REv. 829, 830 (1966).
80
See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 109
(Marshall, J., dissenting): "Status of birth, like the color of one's skin, is something which
the individual cannot control, and should generally be irrelevant in legislative considerations. Yet, illegitimacy has long been stigmatized by our society. Hence, discrimination on
the basis of birth-particularly when it affects-innocent children-warrants specialjudicial
consideration." Justice Stewart, concurring in the majority decision, commented: "But
there are other classifications [besides race] that, at least in some settings, are also
'suspect'-for example, those based upon national origin, alienage, indigency, or illegitimacy." Id. at 61 (footnotes omitted).
81
391 U.S. 68 (1968). See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
82
391 U.S. at 71.
83
Id. at 72.
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rights asserted here [as involving] the intimate, familial relationship
between a child and its own mother. " 84 Both the thrust of the
Court's analysis and the decision to strike down the discrimination
may be viewed as reflecting the scrutiny appropriate to a suspect
classification. 85
Nevertheless, the court has refused to declare illegitimacy a
suspect classification. 86 In fact, in Giana v. American Guaratee &
Liability Co., 87 the Court used language often associated with the
more lenient, minimal level of scrutiny .88 The contrasting language
of Levy and Giana, and the implicit decision not to designate
i'.legitimacy a suspect classification may, however, be reconciled
by considering the nature of the discrimination before the Court.
The Court faced a particularly blatant form of discrimination in
both cases and may have desired to avoid a sweeping holding
where a narrower one would accomplish its objective. Consequently, there was no need to find a suspect classification, since
the legislative schemes under scrutiny did not even satisfy the
"rational basis" test.
In Mathews v. Lucas, 89 the Court's refusal to find illegitimacy to
be a suspect classification 90 was based, in part, upon a view of
Levy and Weber as cases. involving less-than-strict scrutiny. The
Court noted that illegitimacy, unlike race or sex, does not carry
"an obvious badge. " 91 Consequently, having never faced discrimination as severe or pervasive as that experienced by women
and blacks, 92 illegitimates were deemed not to require the greater
degree of judicial protection afforded to those groups. The Court's
observation is not persuasive in view of the fact that national origin
and alienage, despite their invisibility, have been considered "suspect" classifications. 93 Although the decision in Lucas may be
8
.4 Id. at 71. Although he did not elaborate, Justice Douglas may have been alluding to a
fundamental interest in privacy (see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)), perhaps in an attempt to analogize equal protection of the illegitimate to the basic civil rights previously reviewed in the opinion.
85
.Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406.U.S. 164 (1972), also contains language characteristic of strict scrutiny analysis. In that case, the Court found no state interest, "compelling or otherwise," id. at 176, sufficient to justify the discrimination and struck down the
offending provision of the Louisiana workmen's compensation statute.
86
See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
87
391 U.S. 73 (1968). See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra.
88
See notes 155-58 and accompanying text infra. It can be argued, too, that Weber's
connection with the two-tier system is more semantic than substantial. See notes 95-115 and
accompanying text infra. See also Yackle, Thoughts on Rodriguez: Mr. Justice Powell and
the Demise of Equal Protection Analysis in the Supreme Court, 9 U. RICH. L. REV. 181,
207-10 (1975).
89
427 U.S. 495 (1976).
90
Id. at 503-06.
91
Id. at 506.
92 Id.
93
See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin). The Court's reliance here on the visibility of a trait as a
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read by some as dispositive of the issue, it is possible to interpret
the decision much more restrictively. 94
B. A Newer Equal Protection

Some commentators have suggested that the Court's recent decisions reflect a growing reluctance to apply the "either-or" twotier analysis and that the Court is developing a new level of
scrutiny somewhere between minimal and strict. 95 This "newer"
equal protection approach has been described as a "meansfocused, relatively narrow, preferred ground of decision" standard
based on the principle that ''legislative means must substantially
further legislative ends. " 96 This means-oriented analysis rejects
the unquestioning deference to legislatures often associated with a
minimal level of scrutiny in favor of a more exacting level of
scrutiny based less on judicial hypothesis than on expressed legislative purpose and other evidence presented to the Court. 97 The
continued expansion of strict scrutiny, with its implicit normative
assessments of legislative purpose, is checked by the new standard, which reflects a "more modest interventionism" on the part of
the Court. 98
Under this level of scrutiny, classifications involving illegitimacy
have been susceptible to successful equal protection challenges. 99
Determining whether the means chosen "substantially further" the
legislative ends requires the Court to identify and balance the
interests of the illegitimate claimant against those of the state. 100 In
general, the illegitimate' s interest is in the unrestricted receipt of
benefits to which he would have been entitled except for his birth

criterion for determining the permissibility of the classification is open to question as well.
~ee Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 523 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The fact that illegitimacy
1s not as apparent to the observer as sex or race does not make this governmental classification any less odious.").
94
See notes 132-49 and accompanying text irifra.
95
Gunther, supra note 73, at 17-20; Yackle, supra note 88, at 191-94.
This article's division of the equal protection analysis into three segments is not meant to
imply that no other alternatives exist. In particular, Justice Marshall has outlined a flexible
"sliding scale" whose levels of scrutiny are determined according to the importance of the
interests at stake and the reasonableness of the legislated means of promoting the state
interest. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 102-03
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Gunther, supra note 73, at 17-18.
96
Gunther, supra note 73, at 20.
97
Id. at 21.
98
Id. Nonetheless, an argument can be made for the continuing viability of suspect
classifications and fundamental interests as deserving of special attention. Id. at 24.
99
E.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 4395 (S. Ct. Apr. 26, 1977); Jimenez v. Weinberger. 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Gomez v. Perez. 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
0
' " The Weber Court formulated a new equal protection test in terms of a "dual inquiry."
First, what legitimate state interest does the classification promote? Second. what fundamental rights might the classification endanger? 406 U.S. at 173.
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status. 101 The state's competing interest in denying or limiting
those benefits has usually been expressed in terms of general social
policy or the specific purposes of a particular statute. In the case of
illegitimates, states have cited their interest in the protection of
legitimate family relationships 102 and the strengthening of the family unit' 03 to discourage illicit sexual activity . 104 In addition, the
specific purposes of individual statutes, such as providing general
financial support, 105 the replacement of lost support, 106 or the
orderly distribution of property, 107 may reflect a general state
interest in protecting the welfare of its citizens. Finally, courts
have recognized legitimate state interests in the efficient administration of social insurance programs: the prevention of fraud, 108
administrative convenience, 109 and the circumvention of difficult
problems of proof. 110
The "substantial relation" between legislative ends and means
required by the intermediate level of scrutiny has proven difficult
to establish, especially in cases where illegitimates were excluded
from a statutory scheme with the primary purpose of providing
support 111 or loss compensation. 112 Attempts to justify the exclusion on family protection or administrative grounds have been
unsuccessful where the interest of the illegitimate in receiving
benefits coincides with the express statutory purpose of providing
'"' See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Davis v. Richardson. 342 F.
Supp. 588 (D. Conn. 1972). ajf'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
102
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co .. 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972); Glona v. American Guar. &
Liab. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968). See also Parker v. Department of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 453 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1972); Williams v. Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.N.C.
1972); Morris v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Ga. 1972), vacated, 409 U.S. 464
(1973).
103
Parker v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 453 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1972);
Williams v. Richardson, 347 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.N.C. 1972); Morris v. Richardson, 346 F.
Supp. 494 (N .D. Ga. 1972), vacated, 409 U.S. 464 (1973).
10
• Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
105
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Tanner v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 52 (6th
Cir. 1975); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972), ajf'd mem., 409 U.S.
1069 (1972).
106
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Watts v. Veneman, 476 F.2d 529 (D. C. Cir.
1973); Norton v. Weinberger, 364 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Md. 1973), vacated, 418 U.S. 902
(1974), on remand, 390 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Md. 1975), ajf'd sub nom .. Norton v. Mathews,
427 U.S. 524 (1976).
107
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
108
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976);
Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), ajf'd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974).
109
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
110
Perry v. Richardson, 440 F.2d 677 (6th Cir. 1971). But see Beaty v. Weinberger, 478
F.2d at 307: "[W]hat is significant about these cases [Levy and Glona] is the Court's
implicit, if not explicit, disavowal of the notion that difficulties of proof are a sufficient, or
indeed rational. basis for discriminating against illegitimates." See also Gomez v. Perez, 409
U.S. 535. 538 (1973). (Problems of proof are not to be made into an "impenetrable barrier"
which shields "otherwise invidious discrimination.").
111
Jimenez v. _Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
112
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co:, 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
_(1968); Glona v._ American Guar. & Liab. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
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those benefits. 113 When other factors, such as the Court's traditional deference to state prerogatives 114 or a reluctance to expand
the scope of a support statute, 115 have been determinative, the
interests of the illegitimate have not prevailed.
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 116 and Jimenez v. Weinberger111 illustrate the Court's willingness to strike down discrimination against illegitimates by employing the new middle-level
scrutiny. In both cases, interests of illegitimates were held to be
paramount when weighed against the state's interest in providing
support and protecting the family . 118 In Weber, which involved the
rights of illegitimates under Louisiana's workmen's compensation
statute, the Court considered whether there was a "significant
relationship" between legislative means and ends, rather than relying upon either the "rational basis" or the "compelling interest"
test of the two-tier approach to reach its decision.11 9
Similarly, the Jimenez Court, citing Weber with approval, 120
struck down a challenged Social Security provision, not on the
basis of a suspect classification or rational basis analysis, but
rather by means of an extended examination of the degree to which
the legislative classification successfully promoted the statutory
purpose. 121
In Mathews v. Lucas, 122 the Court elaborated on its view of
equal protection with respect to illegitimates. While rejecting suspect status for illegitimacy, 123 the Court described the appropriate
level of scrutiny as being "less than strictest scrutiny" but "not a
toothless one;" 124 more importantly, the Court attempted to clarify
its role in such cases. The Court expressed its unwillingness to
substitute its judgment for that of Congress in '' matters of practical

113
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
114
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537 (1971).
115
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
116
406 U.S. 164 (1972). See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra.
117
417 U.S. 628 (1974). See notes 12-14 and accompanying text supra.
118
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628,632 (1974); Weberv. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164, 175-76 (1972).
119
See note 100 supra. In addition, the Court showed no signs of confining itself to
traditional patterns of equal protection analysis. Language in Weber was drawn freely from
both the stricter level-"compelling" interests, and "illogical and unjust''. results, id. at
175-76---and the more lenient level of scrutiny-"legitimate" and "rational" state interests,
id. at 173, 174.
120
417 U.S. at 632.
121
417 U.S. at 633-37.
122
427 U.S. 495 (1976). See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
123
Id. at 503-06.
124
Id. at 510; but see id. at 519-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (regretting the Court's failure
to enunciate the appropriate level of scrutiny with greater precision). The Court, however,
in Trimble v. Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 4395, 4396 (S. Ct. Apr. 26, 1977), was able to use the
Lucas level of judicial scrutiny to invalidate the challenged provision of the Illinois intestacy
statute.
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judgment and empirical calculation." 125 Rather the Court viewed
its role as "simply to determine whether Congress' assumptions
are so inconsistent or insubstantial as not to be reasonably supportive of its conclusions. " 126 In view of that limitation, the Court
refused to scrutinize more strictly the precision or accuracy of the
legislative classification. The classification will be upheld if it satisfies the threshold determination of consistency and substantiality _127
The Lucas Court rejected the illegitimates' assertion of unconstitutionality because it found a "reasonable relation" between the
classification and the likelihood of the children's dependency on
their absent father at the time of his death. 128 The Court perceived
the congressional purpose behind the classification to be "obviously" administrative convenience, since the classification
avoided the increased burden and expense of case-by-case adjudication . 129 The Court's assessment of the importance of the state
interests was reinforced by its unwillingness to find that the other
factors involved in the classification 130 "lack any substantial relation to the likelihood of actual dependency." 131 Finding that these
assumptions were not "so inconsistent or insubstantial" as to
warrant rejection, the Court upheld the classification.
The difficulty with the Court's analysis in Lucas is its failure.
either to follow Jimenez or to repudiate it despite both claims
arising out of similar statutory requirements and presenting a similar array of competing interests. Both cases challenged the statutory requirement of proof of dependency at the time of the event
insured against. 132 In Jimenez, the Court decided against a strict
12
•
126

~

427 U.S. at 515.
Id. at 516.
127
Id. See Gunther, supra note 73, at 20-24. The sharp dissent by Justice Stevens may
indicate that the transition is not yet complete. "[A)n admittedly illogical and unjust result
should not be accepted without both a better explanation and something more than a
'possibly rational' basis .... [T]he Court should be especially vigilant in examining any
classification which involves illegitimacy." 427 U.S. at 519-20.
128
427 U.S. at 510-16.
12
• Id. at 509.
130
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1970) (state intestacy statutes); 42 U.S.C. §
4l6(h)(3)(A)(i), (B)(i), (C)(i) (1970) (documented proofs of paternity).
131
427 U.S. at 513. After considering the Court's attempt to indicate the substantiality of
the relation between the likelihood of dependency and the illegitimate's inclusion in an
intestate succession scheme, Justice Stevens described the effort as involving "nebulous
inference upon inference." Id. at 522. See also Norton v. Weinberger, 390 F. Supp. 1084 (D.
Md. 1975), ajf'd sub nom., Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976). The district court in
Norton, while upholding the statutory classifications, based its decision in part on the failure
ot: § 402(d)(3) (the presumption of dependency) to include a reference to children qualifying
through § 416(h)(2)(A) (inclusion within an intestacy scheme). But see note 11 supra. The
omission was crucial, in the court's opinion, because if a child was deemed dependent "due
to the unrelated circumstance" of his treatment under local intestacy laws, "a significant
question would be raised about the rational basis for the statutory scheme." 390 F. Supp. at
1090 n.7.
132
/
42 U.S.C. § 416(h}(3)(A}(ii}, (C}(ii) (1970). Other courts have also made marginal
· inroads on the requirement. See. e.g .. Severance v. Weinberger 362 F. Supp. 1348
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application of that provision to the after-born, presently dependent
children of the insured. The Lucas children, on the other hand,
could not prove their dependency since their father was not living
with them at the time of his death. The Court distinguished the
cases on the ground that, while the statute was an absolute bar to
the illegitimates in Jimenez without regard to their actual dependency, nothing in the statute similarly prevented the Lucas children from proving cohabitation or contribution.1 33 The distinction,
however, is actually not as clear as the opinion would indicate . 134
The Court could view the Social Security Act either as providing
support to all eligible recipients 135 or as specifically replacing the
support lost by the recipient upon the withdrawal of the insured
parent from the work force. 136 If the Court is inclined to view
actual dependency (i.e., the receipt of support from the insured) as
a prerequisite to the receipt of benefits, it is also likely to be
persuaded by a justification of the legislative classification as based
upon the likelihood of dependency. Conversely, if the Court views
the statute in terms of a right to support, then actual dependency,
although relevant, will not be a conclusive factor in determining
eligibility. Consequently, arguments based upon the likelihood of
dependency are less persuasive than those which attempt to establish the claimant's right to support.
The Court in Jimenez adopted the broader of the two views
despite the government's assertion that illegitimates, as a class, are
not as likely to have been dependent on the wage earner as other
children. Concluding that this view would bar children born after
the event insured against, as well as thos·e,who had never received
actual support prior to that event, the Court refused to read the
statute as supporting such an interpretation. 137 Although the opinion reflected the particular circumstances of the parties before it, .
the Court was generally sympathetic to the plight of those illegiti-

(D.D.C: 1973) (The court reversed the denial of benefits of a child born after his father

reached sixty-five and fully supported since that time despite the sheer impossibility of
meeting the 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(A)(ii) requirement.); Wagner v. Finch, 413 F.2d 267 (5th
Cir. I 969) (A posthumous child is entitled to benefits on the grounds that the fetus is
sufficiently "in being" to be "lived. with" per 42 U .S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii).).
133 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,512 (1976).
134 Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The difference between this justification [of
administrative convenience] and the argument rejected in Jimenez" is "opaque and insufficient.").
135
See note 98 supra.
136
See note 99 supra.
137
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974). In addition, the operation of the
presumption itself was found to be unfair on the grounds of both over- and underinclusiveness (i.e .. it inevitably presumes the dependency of some children who are in fact
not dependent, while simultaneously barring the claims of those who are not "entitled" to
the presumption but who are actually dependent.). Id. at 637.
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mates falling outside the presumptively dependent categories. 138
Consequently, the Court found the "likelihood" arguments, even
when coupled with the governmental interest in the prevention of
fraud, 139 insufficient to justify the discrimination against the illegitimate claimants.
The Court in Lucas implicitly adopted the narrower interpretation of the statute's purpose. Restating the government's contention that the "actual support" theory reflected congressional intent, the Court accepted "this explanation at face value," 140 Such
a fundamental shift.has consequences which significantly limit ·the
scope of the statute and which place Lucas squarely at odds with
the result and rationale of Jimenez. - ,
The Court may have accepted the ''actual support" theory too
uncritically. As the following discussion suggests, that theory unfairly discim-inates against i_llegitimates, a result that can be avoided
by interpreting the statute in terms of a child's right to support.
Due 'to the operation of the presumption of dependency, 141 the
majority of child recipients are granted benefits without reference
to their dependency. The presumption is extended to all legitimate
children 142 and to those illegitimates who meet a series of qualifying conditions. 143 From these groups no proof of dependency is
required, and undisputed evidence to the contrary will not disqualify them. 144 In fact, the "actual support" theory is applied only
with respect to those illegitimates who are statutorily required to
prove both paternity and dependency. 145
The fact of legitimacy and the qualifying provisions of the statute
may be viewed as evidence, not of actual support, but of the
claimant's right to support, 146 which entitles the claimant to re138
Id. at 636. "[I]t would not serve the purpose of the Act to conclusively deny them an
opportunity to establish their dependency and their right to insurance benefits."
139 Id.
1 0
• 427 U.S. at 507. The Court's reliance on the dependency arguments throughout the
opinion and the degree to which they were found persuasive are additional evidence that the
Court was employing that interpretation. Id. at 507-16. See, e.g., id. at 508-09, where the
Court referred to the "obvious fact" that the presumption is "incrementally over-inclusive"
but permissible, in any case, because of its reasonable relation to the likelihood of the
_ illegitimate's dependency.
141
42 U .S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1970). The presumption of dependency is, in effect, the statutory formulation of the conclusions drawn by the government as to the likelihood of
dependency.
142 Id.
143
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A)-(h)(3)(A)(i), (h)(3)(B)(i), (h)(3)(C)(i) (1970). See notes 7-11 and
accompanying text supra.
144
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 516 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145
These illegitimates qualify through 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii) (1970).
146
The adoption of the "right to support" theory presents the threshold task of defining
the nature of the right. As used in this discussion, the term refers to a right to support which
is legally enforceable against a delinquent parent. The advantage of the definition is its
compatibility with the present statutory scheme, one of whose qualifying provisions for
_illegitimates currently grants "child" status upon production of a judicial support order or
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ceive benefits. Viewed from this perspective, the children who
currently benefit from the operation of the dependency presumption are those legally entitled to support 147 and those "entitled"
because of their status under selected state laws. 148 Since the
presumption operates without reference to the support actually
received by the claimant, entitlement to support may be viewed as
a question of paternity rather than dependency. If so, the imposition of the additional burden of proving dependency on illegitimates able to prove paternity is unnecessary, unfairly exclusive,
and inconsistent with the policy of the statute. A broader interpretation of statutory purpose, focused on the question of the child's
right to support, would not only provide a theoretical foundation
consistent with the practical effect of the statute, but would also
avoid the inevitable imprecision of classifications based upon the
presumed likelihood of actual dependency . 1 g
paternity decree. 42 U.S.C § 416(h)(3)(A)(i), (B)(i), (C)(i) (1970). A shortcoming of the
proposition is the introduction of state law into an act of national scope and application. In
the absence of federal guidelines, the right to support, and hence the right to benefits, will be
determined by local statutes. But see Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (invalidating on
equal protection grounds a Texas statute denying the right of paternal support to illegitimates while granting it to legitimates). It should also be noted that the Act presently
countenances the use of state law, not only with respect to the enforceable right to support,
but with regard to intestate succession and the validity of marriage ceremonies as well. 42
U .S.C. § 416(h)((2)(A), (2)(B) (1970).
147
Legal entitlement results either from legitimacy or from the right to support becoming
judicially enforceable. 42 U .S.C. §§ 416(h)(3)(A)(i), (B)(i), (C)(i) (1970).
148
Special status is conferred by those statutes governing intestate succession, id. §
416(h)(2)(A), and the validity of the parents' marriage ceremony, id. § 416(h)(2)(B). Although the value of these provisions as evidence of dependency has been questioned, see
note 131 supra, they may nevertheless be indicative of a child's right to support. It can be
argued that the child's inclusion within an intestacy scheme or the parents' participation in a
marriage ceremony are indirect evidence of membership in a" sanctioned" family structure
which, once established, "entitles" the child to support.
This social concept of "entitlement" can be perceived in the intestate succession, compensation, and support statutes which exclude illegitimates from their operation. One view
of these statutes interprets the inclusion or exclusion of illegitimates as the result of an
assumption that an unconventional or "nonfamily" relationship does not "entitle" the child
to support, compensation, or a share in the estate. This assumption can be obscured by
statutory emphasis on "tests," such as dependency. which determine the suitability of the
family relationship involved. To the extent that a statutory classification is based on this
kind of assumption, and excludes illegitimates, it can be argued that it does so on grounds
that are impermissibly subjective and which bear no justifiable relation to the disadvantaged
individual-the child who is clearly not responsible for the family context into which he or
she is born. Indeed, the argument seems to suggest that the appropriateness of any examination of the family context is highly questionable.
149
In the event that the Court continues to find the "likelihood" arguments persuasive,
the statute can still be challenged on the grounds that the presumption of dependency is in
fact an invalid irrebuttable presumption. In other contexts, the Court has found a denial of
due process when the presumption implied by the original facts is not "necessarily or
universally true in fact." Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,452 (1973). See also Weinberger v.
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508 (1973). Although the conclusion is
expressed in terms of due process, the examination of the accuracy of the classification in
light of statutory purpose closely resembles the equal protection means-ends analysis and,
thus, is not wholly inappropriate in this context. But see Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doc_trine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1534 (1974) (criticizing the doctrine
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C. Minimal Scrutiny
Classifications involving illegitimates are subject, as are any
legislative classifications, to at least minimal judicial scrutiny
under the equal protection doctrine. Even on this basis, illegitimates have occasionally succeeded in challenging legislative classifications.150 Minimal scrutiny has traditionally been applied to
social and economic legislation 151 where judicial examination of
legislative judgment is generally so deferential as to ensure a finding of constitutionality . 152 In order to be upheld, the legislative
classification must only bear a "rational relation" to the statutory
purpose .153 The Court has been willing to ·uphold a classification if
it could determine that a conceivable set of facts might exist which
would bear a suitably rational relation to statutory purpose. 154
Although Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Co. 155 and
Labine v. Vincent 156 contain language reflecting the "rational relation" requirement, 157 both have peculiarities which make this an
as an unfounded hybrid of equal protection and due process theory, id. at 1547, and a
thinly-veiled, expanded version of strict scrutiny, id. at 1553).
In Jimenez. the Court found the "blanket and conclusive exclusion" invalid to the extent
that actually dependent illegitimates were being denied both the benefits and the opportunity
to prove their dependent status.· The implication which arose from the presumption's
operation-that they were not dependent-was not "necessarily or universally true in fact."
417 U.S. at 636. See also Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), affd, 418 U.S.
901 (1974); Severance v. Weinberger, 362 F. Supp. 1348 (D.D.C. 1973).
In Jimenez. an irrebuttable presumption of nondependency was used to exclude claimants
who were actually dependent but unable to prove dependency "at the time" of their father's
disability. The Lucas challenge was similarly prompted by the inability to prove dependency
"at the time" of the parent's death. Despite the rejection of the Lucas claim, both cases
demonstrate the continuing reliance on dependency as the criterion entitling the child to
statutory benefits.
Adoption of the "right to support" theory, however, permits the presumption to be
rejected on other, more consistent grounds. Under this view, the provision irrebuttably
presumes that illegitimates able to prove paternity, but not dependency, are not entitled to
benefits. If, however, paternity is the actual key to entitlement, then the presumption of
nonentitlement is not "necessarily or universally true in fact" and can be rejected on that
basis. See notes 146-48 and accompanying text supra.
150
See Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1%8); Tanner v. Weinberger,
525 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1975). See also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972);
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
151
E.g .. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483 (1955).
152
Gunther, supra note 73, at 8. See also Note, Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
153
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
154
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
155
391 U.S. 73 (1968). See notes 38-41 and accompanying text supra.
156
401 U.S. 532 (1971). See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
157
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), contains language which focuses
on the irrationality of the relation between the legislative classification and statutory purpose. "[V]isiting this condemnation [of extra-marital liaisons] on the head of an infant is
illogical and unjust." Id. at 175. Weber is better seen, however, as an early example of
middle-level scrutiny. See notes 95-115 and accompanying text supra. See also Trimble v.
Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 4395, 43% (S. Ct. Apr. 26, 19771.
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inappropriate categorization. The Court in Glona most clearly indicated that it was exercising minimal scrutiny. The Court noted
that it saw "no rational basis for assuming that if the natural
mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy would be served. " 158 Significantly, the Court struck down the classification in issue, a result
more often associated with a stricter standard of review . 159
Labine, on the other hand, involved a classification which was
upheld following the perfunctory application of a "rational basis"
test. "Even if we were to apply the 'rational basis' test to the
Louisiana intestate succession statute, that statute clearly has a
rational basis .... " 160 Nonetheless, this result could as easily be
attributed to traditional judicial acquiescence in state judgments
with respect to local intestacy matters. 161

III.

CONCLUSION

Illegitimates suffer significant legal disabilities under social insurance, loss compensation, and intestate succession statutes as a
result of a social prejudice which brings the full force of its moral
judgment to bear on blameless children. Legislative discrimination
on the basis of illegitimacy is vulnerable, however, to judicial
invalidation at all levels of scrutiny under the equal protection
doctrine. The unequal imposition of additional burdens of proof or
persuasion violates the most basic concepts of fairness implicit in
that doctrine.
A strong argument can be presented that classifications based on
illegitimacy-an unalterable trait of birth over which the stigmatized extramarital child has no control-are analogous to the
suspect classifications of race, national origin, and alienage, and
thus should be subject to the same strict level of judicial scrutiny
under the equal protection clause. Alternatively, the interests of
illegitimates may be found to outweigh those of the state under a

158 391 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added), Justice Harlan's dissent supports this.conclusion, id.
at 79, although his descripton of Levy and Glona as "constitutional curiosities" underscores
a deeper dissatisfaction with the results reached. "The Court has reached ... [an] answer
... by a process that can only be described as brute force." Id. at 76.
159 An argument can be raised that Levy ·also belongs in this category despite the tendency
of its references to lean towards a stricter scrutiny approach; the opinion is perhaps
ambiguous enough to permit placement in either level.
160
401 U.S. at 536 n.6 (1971) (emphasis added).
161 See notes 47, 62-68 and accompanying text supra. The Court itself has found Labine
"difficult to place in the pattern of ... equal protection decisions"··concerning illegitimates.
Trimble v. Gordon, 45 U.S.L.W. 4395, 4396 n.12 (S. Ct. Apr. 26, 1977). ·
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newly emerging middle-level scrutiny, involving an examination of
the statute's purpose and the means chosen to effectuate it. Finally, illegitimates can successfully challenge discriminatory classifications on the ground that the scheme lacks a rational relation to
its own goals, thus failing to weather even the minimal level of
equal protection scrutiny. The past vulnerability of legislative discrimination to these challenges justifies the hope that continued
pressure will ultimately result in the elimination of legally
sanctioned prejudice against illegitimate children.
-David Hallissey

